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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
The domination of Bosnia’s politics by nationalist parties representing the country’s three constituent 
peoples is unlikely to come to an end in the October 1 general election. The marked deterioration of 
political discourse in the run-up to the poll highlights the enduring power of zero-sum politics, which 
feed off continuing deep divisions among Bosnia’s citizens. While large-scale violence is highly 
unlikely, destabilizing factors in the region - especially the likely independence of Kosovo - are 
certain to be exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs and will find some resonance within their 
constituencies. Constitutional and police reform will be required for closer ties with the EU at 
precisely the time (first half of 2007) when the Office of the High Representative, the main 
international agency for peace implementation, is phasing out. Whether the pull of Brussels is a 
sufficient substitute for robust international action on the ground remains an open question. 
Die Wahlen vom 1. Oktober werden die Dominanz der nationalistischen Parteien, welche die drei 
konstituierenden Volksgruppen vertreten, wohl kaum in Frage stellen. Die greifbare 
Verschlechterung des politischen Klimas im Vorfeld der Wahlen macht jedoch klar, in welchem 
Ausmass die bosnische Politik immer noch vom Nullsummendenken geprägt ist, welches sich aus der 
anhaltenden Spaltung der Bevölkerung speist. Auch wenn organisierte Gewalt weiterhin äusserst 
unwahrscheinlich erscheint, werden gewisse politische Akteure die destabilisierenden Einflüsse - hier 
insbesondere die bald zu erwartende Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo - zu ihren Gunsten auszunützen 
versuchen, womit sie innerhalb ihrer Volksgruppe auch Erfolg haben dürften. Verfassungs- und 
Polizeireform, die für die vertragliche Anbindung an die EU notwendig sind, werden genau in der 
Periode fällig (in der ersten Hälfte des kommenden Jahres), in der sich der Hohe Repräsentant - die 
Hauptinstanz der Staatengemeinschaft im Lande - aus Bosnien zurückzieht. Ob die Anziehungskraft 
Brüssels einen genügenden Ersatz für robuste internationale Einflussnahme darstellen wird, wird sich 
zeigen müssen. 
Les élections du 1er octobre ne risquent guère de remettre en cause la suprématie des partis 
nationalistes bosniens, représentants des trois groupes ethniques majoritaires. Au cours de la 
campagne électorale, la détérioration marquée du discours politique a toutefois clairement démontré 
à quel point la politique bosnienne reste marquée par une pensée à somme nulle, qui est alimentée 
par les tensions persistantes au sein de la population. Même si la violence organisée semble pour 
l’heure peu probable, certains acteurs politiques sauront délibérément utiliser en leur faveur les 
facteurs déstabilisants dans la région – en particulier l’indépendance presque acquise du Kosovo -  
et connaîtront sans nul doute un succès inégalé auprès de leurs constituants.  Pour développer des 
liens plus étroits avec l’UE, les réformes constitutionnelle et policière sont indispensables et devront 
être engagées dans la première partie de 2007, ce qui coïncide avec la fin de mandat du Bureau du 
Haut Représentant, principale instance en charge du processus de paix dans le pays. Reste à 
démontrer si l’attrait exercé par Bruxelles est un substitut suffisant pour une action internationale 
soutenue. 
A note on terminology 
For reasons of convenience, ‘Bosnia’ will be used throughout this report to refer to the entirety of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (not to be confused with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of 
the two entities into which the country is divided). In the Bosnian context, ‘state’ tends to designate 
the central-level institutions rather than government in the generic sense. Citizens of Bosnia are 
‘Bosnians’ regardless of their ethnicity, while ‘Bosniaks’ are Bosnian Muslims.  
This report makes reference to the ‘international community.’ There is, of course, no such thing in 
any meaningful sense. Rather, the term is used as shorthand for the bewildering array of outside 
players - not including Bosnia’s neighbors - whose interests and concerns are engaged in the process 
of making peace and building a state in Bosnia. 
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1 Introduction 
In state-building as in other human endeavors, success tends to be seen as resulting from rare 
coincidences of highly specific factors and failure as the product of broad structural pressures. 
Germany and Japan show up as the big exceptions in the annals of state-building while Cambodia, 
East Timor, Congo, Afghanistan, and Kosovo are the depressing rule. To this list of failures, near-
failures, or impending failures we might soon have to add Bosnia. 
State-building, however, is not the same as peace implementation, which has gone rather well in 
Bosnia, and failure in any case is more nuanced than it might appear. The fundamentals (unstable 
neighborhoods, recalcitrant warlords, irreconcilable agendas, weak economies) are key elements in 
any peace settlement, but they are not immutable. The changes in Bosnia’s neighborhood - the 
demise of the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes and the subsequent democratization in Croatia and 
Serbia - are a crucial stabilizing factor that could not have been anticipated at the time the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP) was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, 
in November 1995. In an even more predatory neighborhood Bosnia might not have survived. 
But if Bosnia has survived, it has also spent all its energies in the process. There is little political 
capital left to confront the critical challenges that are now, in mid-2006, coming together. The peace 
implementation struggle of the last ten years has used up the domestic and severely depleted the 
external resources that are needed for the struggle of state-building, which might take another ten 
years (roughly the time needed for Bosnia to become a credible candidate for membership in the 
European Union). In the meantime, new pressures have accumulated and are waiting to be relieved. 
If the neighborhood turned for the better around the year 2000, it turned for the worse in 2006 as 
the last vestiges of the old Yugoslavia - a fiction of international diplomacy since at least 1999 - are 
being dismantled and both Montenegro and Kosovo are going their own ways, with direct 
implications for the continued viability of the Bosnian state.  
What does this state look like today? Dayton created what is probably the most extreme example of 
ethno-federalism in the contemporary world. Not only was Bosnia internally divided into two 
entities, the Serb-dominated ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS) and the predominantly Bosniak (Muslim) and 
Croat ‘Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (plus the District of Brcko), it was also saddled with 
numerous ethnic veto points and quotas that virtually guaranteed the continued control of the 
apparatus of government by the three main ethnic parties. The GFAP thereby not only created an 
extremely cumbersome policy process that would frequently result in deadlock, it also left 
unresolved the conflicts that had come to the fore in the 1992-1995 war and enshrined the ethno-
nationalist principle as the foundation of public life.  
At the same time, the Dayton agreement included numerous provisions that would in due course 
strengthen the state. Its human rights provisions were among the most sweeping ever to be included 
in a peace agreement. The GFAP went far beyond previous practice by guaranteeing the right of the 
displaced to return not just to their country of origin but to their actual pre-war homes. And, perhaps 
most importantly, it created the space for a robust and invasive international mission to implement 
the agreement. Over the years, implementation has mitigated some of the GFAP’s shortcomings 
through concerted action, for example by strengthening the central government far beyond anything 
foreseen in Dayton.  
However, these undertakings - often a reaction to shifting circumstances or specific challenges - 
never became part of a unified strategy to confront the nationalist powerbrokers and build up the 
legitimacy of the atrophied structures at the central level. In addition to the lack of an overarching 
vision concerning the end state of state-building in Bosnia, the peace mission, led by the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR) and the commanders of the 60,000 NATO peacekeepers deployed at 
the end of December 1995, also lacked operational focus for its first 18 months. Even after corrective 
action was taken in mid-1997 and implementation accelerated along several axes, no 
comprehensive peace implementation strategy, let alone a more forward-looking state-building 
strategy, was forthcoming, a fact that has decisively impaired international action in Bosnia. 
Introduction  
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Within the parameters of peace implementation, then, the international community in Bosnia has 
done quite well, but it has failed to put in place the foundations of a proper state, though building 
blocks do exist (a credible judiciary at the state level, for example). The forward-looking provisions 
of the GFAP have only haltingly been activated, and their transformative potential was never put at 
the service of a unified end-state vision. 
Many of the problems identified in the first part of this report may reflect specificities of the Bosnian 
situation, but they are also manifestations of the challenges inherent in any state-building project 
that is primarily driven by external actors. The nature of these problems, and the theoretical 
underpinnings of state-building more generally, remain ill-understood despite a recent surge in 
analytical attention in the wake of such missions. This analytical gap is especially acute when it 
comes to political legitimacy, a precondition for affective state-building that can only derive from an 
adequate vision of the nature of the state that is to be built. If today’s external state-builders are 
skilled at establishing and strengthening the formal institutions of the state, they are largely helpless 
faced with the challenge of building the state as a vehicle for the realization of a social contract. 
While the state as a service station can be reconstructed through specific technical interventions, this 
will not provide sufficient glue for societies that have just gone through traumatic events that often 
eroded the foundations of political community. 
Peace implementation in Bosnia unfolded largely along the lines of this narrative. But diagnosing the 
failure of state-building with reference only to its external protagonists misses an entire part of the 
story. The main responsibility for the current state falls on Bosnia’s own post-war elites and their 
manipulation of the political process to suit their own goals. The numerous veto points and ethnic 
quotas built into the country’s constitutional set-up, plus the extreme devolution of power down to 
mostly mono-ethnic municipalities, cantons, or entities ensured that they were largely unchecked in 
pursuing their separatist agendas. This, of course, was a direct result of the 1992-1995 war and the 
way it had ended.  
The war had been fought over the very make-up of the polity, its geographic and demographic 
boundaries. An independent, sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina ran counter to the designs for a 
Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia; Belgrade and Zagreb enlisted the Bosnian Serbs and the 
Bosnian Croats in their fight against the idea and the reality of an integrated, ethnically mixed 
Bosnia. This conflict remained fundamentally unresolved in the GFAP, which in consequence 
included both integrative and partitionist provisions that in turn fed into the lack of vision on the 
part of the international community. Over the last ten years, the lack of vision about the 
fundamental character of the Bosnian state has given rise to simulated state-building, creating a 
virtual state. Large segments of the Bosnian population continue to regard the central government 
as either irrelevant or illegitimate. 
At the most fundamental level, Bosnia is not yet generating demand for ‘stateness’ sufficient to 
sustain the formal institutions of government with a steady supply of legitimacy. That void is 
currently filled by the intrusive presence of the international community - a presence that is no 
longer sustainable as donors and political backers are getting restless. In recent years, the 
expression ‘from Dayton to Brussels’ - referring to a shift in emphasis away from peace 
implementation towards European integration - has gained currency, suggesting that the deus ex 
machina of the OHR may be replaced by that of Brussels. But as of mid-2006, Bosnia remains firmly 
stuck in the Dayton phase: the goal of the international peace mission - “to make peace in BiH truly 
self-sustaining, and to put the country irreversibly on to the road to statehood within the European  
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Union,” according to the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan1 - has clearly not yet been achieved: 
the country has not been able to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the 
EU, or to decisively move towards police reform (a precondition for the SAA). Previous compromises 
between central and entity government, for example over the distribution of tax revenue, are being 
questioned. Bosnia’s unstable neighborhood is once again having a detrimental effect on its politics, 
prompting Bosnian Serb calls for an independence referendum. An important factor in the endgame 
equation of the international community is Bosnia’s constitution (Annex 4 of the GFAP): at the same 
time an expression of Bosnia’s divisions and their multiplier, its backward-looking provisions will 
need to be amended if its forward-looking elements are to be fully activated for the purpose of 
building the Bosnian state. But in April, a constitutional reform package was defeated by a coalition 
of Croats for whom the amendments went too far and Bosniaks for whom they didn’t go far enough. 
There is little prospect that it will be passed any time soon. 
Important aspects of peace implementation in Bosnia are not discussed in any depth in this report, 
above all economic development, about which the GFAP is almost completely silent, or the role of 
education both in building a durable peace and in preparing the country for the demands of 
European integration. Instead, the report focuses on those aspects that are most directly linked to 
international action in support of the GFAP and their implications for Bosnia’s domestic politics. 
The first chapter of the report provides an overview of peace implementation in Bosnia and the 
ambiguous but paramount role of the international community and especially the OHR, whose 
presence constituted considerably more than a classic peacekeeping mission but rather less than a 
proper protectorate. The second chapter discusses the factors that make 2006 a pivotal year in 
which it should become clear whether Bosnia will manage the transition from mere peace 
implementation to proper state-building. 
 
______________________ 
1 OHR, Mission Implementation Plan (January 2003), available at <http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=29145>. 
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2 A short history of peace implementation 
Two basic narratives have emerged about the ten years of peace implementation in Bosnia and the 
reason why this period has produced mixed and perhaps disappointing results. The first maintains 
that the GFAP was essentially a good agreement that suffered from bad implementation, especially 
in the first two years.2 The second narrative traces implementation problems back to the very text of 
the GFAP, with its unresolved tension between integrationist and partitionist elements, and between 
strong declarations of principle and weak provisions for enforcement. These commentators tend to 
see the GFAP as the “pursuit of war by other means”3 rather than as a blueprint for a lasting peace. 
In fact, peace implementation must be considered in its totality, which includes the GFAP as well as 
the various policies pursued by the international peace implementers in the postwar period, which 
were in turn shaped by the identities, interests, and preferences of actors on the ground.  
Bosnia has experienced slow but steady progress since Dayton as incremental improvements have 
added up to a dramatic transformation of the situation in Bosnia. This development was by no 
means preordained. Bosnia was a devastated country when 60,000 NATO peacekeepers entered it at 
the very end of 1995 on a one-year mandate, in line with the official U.S. position that “if a year 
doesn’t work, two, three, or five years won’t do either”.4 The conflict had left over 100,000 people 
dead5 and uprooted over 2 million out of a pre-war population of just under 4.4 million; Bosnia’s 
infrastructure and housing stock had suffered extensive damage in three and a half years of 
hostilities; large areas were scarred by what had come to be known as “ethnic cleansing.” The 
country was divided into two antagonistic para-states, or ‘entities,’ the Serb Republic (RS) and the 
largely Bosniak-Croat Federation, that maintained barely any relations, while the central government 
was almost invisible for the first post-war years. 
2.1 Peacekeeping 
At the time, there were widespread fears that the peace agreement would not hold and that 
hostilities might resume, leading to casualties among peacekeepers. There were also well-founded 
concerns that the mandate of the main civilian agency for peace implementation, the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR), was too weak.  
While NATO did not sustain any casualties from violence, it managed to squander the political 
capital generated at Dayton through its passive posture during the immediate post-war period, 
especially during the unification of Sarajevo, when it stood by as armed Serb gangs forced ethnic 
Serbs to evacuate (and often torch) their flats.6 IFOR’s outright refusal to arrest persons indicted for 
war crimes, including Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic and military commander General 
Ratko Mladic, who both came in contact with the peacekeepers, sent a chilling signal to would-be 
returnees; emboldened ethno-nationalists in their obstruction of GFAP implementation; and left the 
organized-crime networks in place that would stunt Bosnia’s economic and political development  
 
 
______________________ 
2  General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (GFAP), International Legal Materials 35:1 (January 1996), 
pp.75-169, also available at <www.ohr.int>. 
3  Carl Dahlman and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: The International Community and the Returns 
Process in Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Political Geography, 24 (2005), pp.569–599 at 581, where the expression 
refers to the implementation of Dayton. 
4  U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, quoted in Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 1998, 
p.65. Holbrooke, according to his memoirs, harbored private misgiving about the policy. 
5 According to the most recent research available from the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center 
(www.idc.org.ba). See also Vesna Peric Zimonjic, “Five Years On, Milosevic is Still in the Dock,” The Independent, February 
13, 2006.  
6  See Julian Borger, “Serb Exodus Exposes Nato’s Failure,” The Guardian, March 20, 1996. 
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while also reportedly financing the flight of indicted war criminals.7 Each one of these issues 
subsequently required corrective action from the international community, often through 
institutional arrangements and policy shifts that consumed human, political, and financial resources 
much needed in other areas.  
Today, international peacekeepers are still present in Bosnia, but they are now under EU command 
(EUFOR) and barely visible. The stability achieved over the past years has allowed them to draw 
down to some 7,000, and further reductions are under consideration for 2007. The OHR has just 
announced its plan to close by end of June 2007, effectively declaring its mission to have been 
accomplished.8 While the decision to transform the OHR into an office of the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) with fewer powers is not without problems, it is nonetheless an indication of 
how far Bosnia has come over the last decade. 
2.2 The Bonn powers: peace implementation 
The preconditions for the current situation were created by a shift during 1997-1998 in the way the 
international community projected its power in Bosnia. Throughout 1997, the pressure for a more 
robust approach to peace implementation had been growing, prompted in part by the recognition 
that the process was heading towards meltdown, partly by a change of guard that brought in 
decision-makers with a tougher posture, above all Madeleine Albright (who became U.S. Secretary 
of State in January 1997) and Tony Blair (who was elected U.K. Prime Minister in May).  
This resulted in a more aggressive military posture by SFOR, including the first arrests of persons 
indicted for war crimes. On the civilian side, the first High Representative, Carl Bildt, managed to 
convince the body he reported to, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), that he needed more 
powers.9 These included the right for the OHR “to curtail or suspend any media network or program 
whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Peace 
Agreement,” as stated by the PIC at a meeting in Sintra in May 1997.10 At its next meeting in Bonn 
in December, the PIC handed the OHR a whole series of even more intrusive instruments, the so-
called Bonn powers, which were subsequently used by the OHR as a basis to: 
− enact or revoke legislation (e.g., property laws) and pass binding decisions (e.g., on 
uniform license plates or state symbols); 
− create public institutions deemed necessary for the functioning of the government (e.g., a 
State Court, a State Border Service, and a Defense Reform Commission);  
− dismiss public officials and bar them from holding public office in the future (e.g., the 
president of RS and the Croat member of the state presidency); 
− vet candidates for public office (e.g., cabinet ministers); 
− fine or ban political parties and bar individuals from party functions. 
 
 
______________________ 
7 Elizabeth Neuffer, “Arrest Warrants for Karadzic, Mladic: A Test for Clinton,” Boston Globe, July 14, 1996. 
8 Agence France Presse, “Bosnia To Be Left without Powerful International Supervisor Next Year,” June 23, 2006. 
9 The PIC is a consortium of 55 interested parties, mostly governments but also international organizations, that was 
established in order to avoid handing oversight over the OHR to the UN.  
10 Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, May 30, 1997, 
available at <www.ohr.int>. 
 
A short history of peace implementation  
   
 
7
 
 
These powers were initially used to put in place the core elements of state identity such as a 
citizenship law, a national flag and anthem, a currency, and uniform license plates to facilitate 
freedom of movement, as well as to remove officials who were openly working against these steps 
or key provisions of the GFAP. In a second phase under HR Petritsch, the powers were primarily  
applied to create key state-level institutions (e.g. the State Border Service) and reform Bosnia’s 
creaking economy in the areas of taxation, privatization, and payment systems. Under HR Ashdown, 
the focus shifted from the creation of a legal framework towards application of that framework by 
domestic authorities, resulting in fewer impositions of laws but more removals of officials. 
The Bonn powers were the single most important element in the transformation of a limited, ad-hoc 
peacekeeping mission into a sustained exercise in state-building. They have without any doubt 
helped move Bosnia along a path it eventually needed to take for the sake of a functioning polity 
and in pursuit of European integration, a goal that is shared by overwhelming majorities among all 
communities. At the same time, the powers have stunted Bosnia’s political development and 
encouraged local politicians to feel accountable vis-à-vis the OHR rather than their constituents. 
2.3 Refugee return 
Among the pivotal GFAP provisions whose sluggish implementation forced the PIC to draw up the Bonn 
powers was the restitution of pre-war property to rightful owners and the effective return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes. Return had been a cornerstone of the Dayton 
settlement from the very beginning. By partially undoing the process that had defined the war - the violent 
unmixing of populations - return would help to defeat the separatist agendas of Bosnia’s Serbs and Croats 
(supported by Belgrade and Zagreb) that still threatened the Bosnian state. The GFAP’s return provisions 
largely retained the language that had already been codified in the Bosniak-Croat Washington Agreement 
of March 1994, reflecting the paramount importance of the return issue for the Bosniaks and the Bosnian 
government. It also reflected anxiety on the part of Western governments that had given temporary 
asylum to hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees and wanted them to return as quickly as possible. 
In consequence, the GFAP declared, “All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to 
their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were 
deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be 
restored to them”.11 The GFAP clearly intended this right to go beyond the merely declaratory by 
underpinning it with robust implementation instruments that focused on actual return rather than mere 
restitution of property. For that reason, the compensation mechanisms outlined in the GFAP were never 
implemented.12 
Despite the recognition that actual return was paramount to Bosnia’s reconstruction as a viable state, it 
took the international community roughly two years to agree on return as a strategic priority, to properly 
assess the main obstacles to return, and to articulate a plan for dealing with them. This time of strategic 
readjustment was largely lost for ‘minority’ return (return to areas where returnees were a post-war 
minority, though frequently a pre-war majority) but saw a peak in majority return. Of the 430,000 
returnees in 1996-1997, just ten percent were members of a post-war minority. It was only in 2001-2002 
that minority returns peaked at around 100,000 returns in each year. 
 
______________________ 
11 GFAP, Annex 7, Article I.1. 
12 See Rhodri C. Williams, “Post-conflict Property Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Implications for 
International Standard-Setting and Practice,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 37 (Spring 
2005), pp. 441–553 at 454. 
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But if international policy-makers understood the power of return, so did the domestic forces opposed to 
reintegration. They obstructed return wherever they could, forcing a readjustment of the policy 
instruments utilized by the UNHCR (the agency in charge of return) and the OHR (the agency with the 
required power of persuasion or coercion). In 1997, the OHR set up an interagency Return and 
Reconstruction Task Force (RRTF) to support the return process and prevent freelancing by implementing 
agencies, complemented by a comprehensive plan for the restitution of property, the Property Law  
Implementation Plan (PLIP). The PLIP “succeeded in turning what was formerly a highly politicized issue 
into a simple question of adherence to the law”.13 The complex issue of return, with its manifold 
implications for the balance of power at all levels, was broken down into its components, which allowed 
the international community to zoom in on the one issue that provoked the least resistance and had the 
most unambiguous force of the law behind it. The PLIP became a demonstration of what the focused 
application of inter-agency power in pursuit of a clear strategic objective could achieve.  
Any assessment of return policy ultimately hinges on numbers. According to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), a total of 1,011,278 individuals, or roughly half of the number of people who were 
forcibly displaced during the war, returned to their pre-war homes between January 1, 1996 and October 
31, 2005; of these, 453,986 were minority returnees.14 Retrospective claims that higher numbers of 
refugees and IDPs should have returned to their pre-war residences misjudge the pull - mostly economic, 
but also social and cultural - of the places, often cities or larger towns, to which Bosnians were displaced 
during the war. In many cases, forced migration occurred from locations that had seen considerable out-
migration even before the war, and whose economies, especially given the devastation caused by the 
war, simply would not have been able to sustain large-scale return. It is not surprising that mainly the 
elderly have returned to such places. Given these structural factors, which were exacerbated by the war 
but not caused by it, the numbers of returnees are quite impressive.  
Perhaps more ambiguous was the effect of return on politics in Bosnia.15 The expectation was that a 
substantial amount of re-mixing would force political actors at all levels to operate in a less exclusionary 
manner and to reach across the communal divide. Return did, in fact, force an adjustment to the 
fundamental Dayton principle of lodging power in the overarching unit with the least ethnic diversity, the 
cantons in the Federation and the entity in RS. At neither level were there provisions for including non-
dominant constituent peoples of Bosnia in decision-making (the exception being the two highly mixed 
cantons in the Federation), a situation that inhibited minority return and became untenable once a critical 
mass of minority returnees had taken up residence in these locations. In the year 2000, Bosnia’s 
Constitutional Court issued a series of rulings that came to be known as the ‘constituent peoples decision.’ 
It ruled that the provisions of the entity constitutions which declared Serbs to be constituent in RS and 
Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation were unconstitutional, prompting wide-ranging changes to entity 
and cantonal constitutions that extended Bosnia’s power-sharing arrangements to all levels of 
government and provided for equitable representation of the three constituent peoples in public 
administration.16 This latter provision was drafted with reference to the census of 1991 until such time as 
refugee return has been completed, which means that Croats and Serbs will be over-represented in the 
institutions of the RS until either substantial additional return has taken place or the Annex 7 process has  
 
______________________ 
13 International Crisis Group, Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International Community Ready? ICG Balkans Report 
No.95 (May 30, 2000), p.6. 
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Comparative Analysis on Access to Rights of Refugees 
and Displaced Persons (December 2005), p. 209.  
15 The following section draws from Florian Bieber, “Towards Better Governance with More Complexity?” in Christophe Solioz 
and T.K. Vogel (eds.), Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2004), pp. 74-87. 
16 See International Crisis Group, Implementing Equality: The ‘Constituent Peoples’ Decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Europe 
Report No.128 (April 16, 2002). 
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been declared completed. As of mid-2006, however, it is probably safe to say that at most a few tens of 
thousands are actively pursuing return. 
2.4 State-building 
The Bonn powers also facilitated the strengthening of existing and the establishment of new 
institutions at the state level. In line with the severely limited competencies of the state level 
outlined in the constitution (i.e., Annex 4 GFAP), Bosnia’s first Council of Ministers included just 
three ministries in a complicated set-up that virtually ensured policy paralysis, for example through 
the required consensus in decision-making. Through a series of rulings by Bosnia’s Constitutional 
Court and new laws - some of them imposed by the OHR - the Council of Ministers was restructured 
and the number of ministries increased to nine; a draft law to add two more portfolios (for 
agriculture, food, and rural development and for science, technology, and the environment) was 
submitted to parliamentary procedure in 2006 but is currently stalled. The Council of Ministers’ 
weakness was a reflection of the division of wartime Bosnia into three para-states, reduced by the 
Washington Agreement of March 1994 to the two ‘entities’ that would subsequently be recognized 
at Dayton, the predominantly Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb-
dominated Republika Srpska. The entities were given all the competencies that were not explicitly 
assigned to the central government, and the functioning of the joint institutions was further 
impeded by extensive checks and balances.17  
Such power-sharing mechanisms have been built into Bosnia’s system of governance at all levels, 
often producing policy paralysis and inefficiencies. Bosnia’s bicameral parliament consists of the 
House of Representatives and the House of Peoples, where the Federation is represented with two 
thirds of deputies and the RS with one third. Laws require a majority of overall deputies that also 
includes at least one-third of the members representing each entity, the so-called ‘entity voting.’ 
While bicameral systems are typical for federal states around the world, Bosnia’s set-up is unusual 
since in both chambers, two thirds of the deputies represent the Federation and one third the RS. 
(The only difference is that the House of Peoples only includes Bosniaks and Croats from the 
Federation and Serbs from the RS, selected by the parliaments of the respective entity, which has 
also raised questions as to its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR, 
which has precedence over Bosnia’s domestic legislation.) 
Bosnia’s collective presidency, with its largely ceremonial role and rotating chair, consists of one 
member from each of the constituent peoples; the Serb member is elected by voters in RS, the 
Bosniak and Croat members by voters in the Federation (a provision that has frequently been 
criticized as violating the ECHR). 
Representatives of the constitutionally recognized group of ‘Others’ - Bosnian citizens who for 
whatever reason do not identify as belonging to any of the three constituent peoples, perhaps 
because they are members of a minority group (Jews, Roma), are of mixed background, or reject the 
notion of ethnic affiliation as such - cannot be elected either to the Bosnian Presidency or to the 
House of Peoples.   
The gradual assumption by the central government of additional competencies was accompanied by 
an extension of the complex power-sharing mechanisms down to the entity level, creating what  
 
 
______________________ 
17 For an outline of Bosnia’s system of power-sharing and its consociational features, see Florian Bieber, Ethnic Structure, 
Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector: Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: Palgrave, 2006), ch.4(b). 
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Bieber has called “cascades of power-sharing”.18 This far-reaching change in 2000-2002 came about 
as a result of the constituent peoples decision, which held that Bosnia’s three main communities 
were constituent across its territory and should therefore be equitably represented in entity-level 
institutions as well. Since the entity constitutions had not been changed at Dayton, they still 
contained language that made the RS the entity of Bosnia’s Serbs and the Federation the entity of 
Bosnia’s Croats and Bosniaks. This was part of the great bargain at Dayton, which preserved the 
state of Bosnia but only at the cost of extreme devolution to the entities.  
As O’Brien points out, key elements for a vigorous state-building program were in fact contained in 
the GFAP; they made possible the subsequent process of strengthening the central government 
without the need for a constitutional overhaul. But in the absence of a clear strategy on the part of  
the international community - an absence that also included a reluctance to systematically confront 
obstructionist parties in the initial phase of peace implementation - such a program was not 
undertaken.19 Peace implementation instead was marked by shifting priorities, inter-agency rivalries, 
and bad planning. Before the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) of 2003, the international 
community never articulated what the end state of state-building in Bosnia should be. By extension, 
the GFAP bodies lacked a standard against which to measure progress. What would a ‘mission 
accomplished’ for peace implementation look like? It was the realization that such a standard was a 
conceptual prerequisite for any disengagement that prompted the formulation of the MIP.  
Regardless of the concrete elements of such an end-state vision, however, it was clear that the 
international project of building a functional central state in Bosnia could only be realized in a 
piecemeal fashion. The powers of the central government were expanded across policy areas one by 
one, and it proved very difficult for entity-based elites to resist change that was couched in terms of 
functional requirements rather than as part of a political transformation. This approach was less 
conceptually coherent than the wholesale revision of the GFAP and the entity system would have 
been; but given the international community’s lacking appetite for confronting the nationalist parties 
and the impossibility of a wholesale renegotiation of the GFAP, it was the only option on the table. 
The GFAP’s internal contradictions emerged as a reflection of the incompatible state-building 
projects pursued by the parties to the conflict and their outside sponsors. The Bosnian Serb 
leadership, once its bid for union with Serbia had been defeated, would not settle for anything less 
than an ethnic para-state inside Bosnia with as many attributes of statehood as possible, above all a 
name that implied sovereignty. The Bosniak leadership, which was in charge of Bosnia’s central 
institutions and now in an uneasy alliance with the Bosnian Croats, insisted on provisions that 
would in principle allow the reintegration of the country. By internalizing these opposing agendas, 
the constitution set the stage for the post-war conflicts to unfold. 
2.5 The limits of imposition 
The gradualist approach was quite successful within its parameters, but there has always been a 
natural limit to how far it could progress. That limit now appears to have been reached. As of 
September 2006, it has proven impossible, among other things, to extend the approach of 
negotiating or imposing technocratic solutions to political problems into the domain of policing. 
Police reform, which by its very nature targets the nerve center of nationalist power in Bosnia and is 
therefore inescapably political, has stalled with little prospect of movement any time soon. It may 
well be that the price to be paid for agreement is the complete hollowing-out of the core provision  
 
______________________ 
18 Bieber, “Towards Better Governance,” p. 76. 
19 James C. O’Brien, personal communication to author, July 12, 2006. 
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of the reform - the removal of the police from political control by the entities. Whether such a reform 
is worth having is a question the international community has so far answered with a clear no. But 
the stark choice before the international community may now be to either abandon the goal of 
police regions that cut across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (thereby giving up the core principle of 
the reform) or to impose a solution. The first option would leave a key building block for a fully 
sovereign, unified Bosnia unfinished, while the second would run counter to the entire current model 
of exercising international power, which maintains that no decision of such far-reaching importance 
should be imposed from outside.  
In addition to showing up the limits of international power in Bosnia, failed police reform would also 
prevent the government from signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, 
a critical first step on the way to eventual membership. This may yet salvage the deal, however, as  
decision-makers determine that the loss in popularity over a failed SAA would outweigh the gain 
from failed police reform.  
That the international community’s state-building approach has inherent limits was pointed out by 
the Venice Commission, an advisory body on constitutional matters of the Council of Europe, in a 
2005 report.20 The report noted that the Constitution’s human rights provisions had in the past been 
used to justify additional responsibilities for the central government, as were Article I.4 (on free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and persons), Article III.4 (on the Presidency facilitating inter-
entity cooperation) and Article III.5, which stipulates that the state level “shall assume responsibility 
for such other matters… as are necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence, and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” providing for additional 
institutions to carry out such responsibilities. The report points out that the “extensive interpretation 
of state responsibilities has clear limits” and underlines that in all cases where these provisions were 
used to support the assumption of additional responsibilities by the state, the OHR “played a 
decisive role”.21 This was true for defense and intelligence reform, the indirect taxation authority, 
and the empowerment of state-level judiciary institutions.  
This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion outlined by the Venice Commission. Since Bosnia will 
be unable to progress towards European integration with its current, weak institutions; since the 
consent of the entities, especially the RS, to measures required by the process of Euro-Atlantic 
integration is doubtful; and since the OHR’s paramount role in ensuring reform and compliance is 
about to be phased out, the Venice Commission “considers a revision of the State Constitution to 
strengthen the responsibilities of the State to be indispensable”.22 Tentative steps towards such an 
overhaul were undertaken in 2006, but the results were hardly encouraging. 
 
 
______________________ 
20 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative (Venice: Council of Europe, March 11-12, 2005). 
21 Venice Commission, Opinion, 22-23.  
22 Venice Commission, Opinion, ¶26-28. 
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3 2006: A watershed year 
Against the considerable achievements of peace implementation in Bosnia and the more modest 
results of state-building discussed in the previous chapter, the year 2006 has brought a marked 
deterioration of the political climate. This development can in part be attributed to the general 
election to be held on October 1 and the fact that any new government will eventually operate 
without the constraints of the OHR’s presence. But the greater part reflects Bosnia’s wartime 
divisions as they are mediated through the peace settlement and its implementation, and contingent 
factors that have arisen over the last few years both inside Bosnia and in the broader neighborhood, 
notably the question of independence for Kosovo, an issue likely to be decided towards the end of 
2006. Indeed, an extraordinary number of these factors are coming together this year, producing 
perhaps the greatest challenge to peace implementation and state-building Bosnia has encountered 
since the war. 
A glance at the June 30 cover of Sarajevo’s leading newsweekly Dani will support the proposition 
that many of Bosnia’s wartime divisions are very much alive. Under the headline “BiH without the 
OHR” - the magazine was reporting on the announcement by the PIC that the OHR would close 
down at the end of June 2007 - it pictured RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdzic, a 
leading Bosniak politician, both in combat fatigues, Dodik brandishing a light machine gun and 
Silajdzic clutching an assault rifle. The implication is clear: the two frontrunners in the October 1 
general election will use whatever means necessary to achieve their goals once the OHR’s power of 
coercion has been replaced with the EUSR’s power of persuasion. But what are their goals? 
Dodik and Silajdzic are the leaders of the RS-based Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) 
and the Bosniak Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), respectively - the two parties that have 
most successfully challenged the predominance of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) as the ‘natural’ ethno-nationalist ruling party of Serbs and Bosniaks. 
Neither party is non-nationalist; both of them primarily, if not exclusively, cater to their ethnic 
community. Whether this is out of ideology or opportunism is ultimately of little import. Both Dodik 
and Silajdzic are pursuing the main strategies that politicians from their ethnic group have been 
pursuing since Dayton: the Bosnian Serbs’ primary strategy to keep power and protect the integrity 
of their community has been to preserve a strong RS, with only grudging transfers of responsibility 
to the central government, while the Bosniaks’ primary strategy has been to build an effective 
central state at the expense of entity power. These are not just political strategies pursued by 
ruthless elites; they reflect perceptions and preferences that are quite widespread among ordinary 
citizens. In an opinion poll conducted in November 2005, 41.5% of interviewed Bosnian Serbs - a 
plurality - agreed that “Dayton has generally been positive and should not be altered” while 63.2% 
of interviewed Bosniaks agreed that “Dayton was necessary to end the war, but now BiH needs a 
new constitution to prepare for the EU”.23  
Such views put Serbs and Bosniaks at opposite ends of the continuum that leads from peace 
implementation to state-building or from the GFAP’s cease-fire measures to its provisions for a 
lasting settlement. The Bosnian Serbs have evolved from harsh critics of the GFAP (because it denied 
them independent statehood and prevented their union with Serbia) to its most avid defenders 
(because it protects the existence of the RS within a weak Bosnia). The Bosniaks, by contrast, 
continue to be the main champions of a strong central government and a system of governance that 
would include only a minimum of federal or consociational features. As the only one of Bosnia’s 
three constituent peoples without an external kin state, Bosniaks have a natural interest in 
recreating a unified Bosnia. As the main victims of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ they also have an interest in  
 
______________________ 
23 Prism Research, NSF project survey, reported in Gearóid ó Tuathail, John O’Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, “Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 47:1 (2006), pp. 
61-75 at 72. 
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reducing the power of those levels of government that can make life difficult for recent or 
prospective returnees, or indeed for any sort of (post-war) minority. And as Bosnia’s single largest 
community, Bosniaks have an interest in replacing the group-rights provisions of the GFAP with a 
focus on individual rights.  
The Dani cover therefore symbolizes a state-building project usurped by nationalist Bosniaks (though 
supported by a great number of non-nationalists on all sides as well) on the one hand and a literal-
minded, narrow interpretation of the GFAP’s entity provisions advanced by the Bosnian Serbs on the 
other. Neither position offers much by way of a forward-looking settlement; both protagonists are 
still fighting the war with other means. 
Silajdzic is the favorite for the Bosniak seat in the Bosnian Presidency in the October poll, while 
Dodik intends to continue as RS Prime Minister or perhaps to assume the chairmanship of the state-
level Council of Ministers. The SNSD is now Bosnia’s most popular party, according to opinion 
polls,24 and has been in power in the RS since late February, after a first spell in office between 1998 
and 2001. It represents a mixture of technical competence, especially in relation to economic 
matters (Dodik is a successful businessman), and strong nationalist elements that has proven 
irresistible to RS voters. The SBiH has also seen remarkable growth in popularity in the first half of 
2006, mostly propelled by its staunch opposition to the constitutional reform package and the 
renewed visibility of Silajdzic, a charismatic figure who has been slipping in and out of everyday 
politics ever since the war. (The support by Bosnia’s largest daily, Dnevni avaz, and the leader of the 
Islamic Community will not have hurt, either.) Only one major party, the Social Democrats (SDP), has 
been able to overcome the tight nexus of ethno-politics and party organization, but it has failed - for 
complex reasons that include bad leadership - to mount a vigorous challenge to the prevailing model 
of attaining and keeping political power in Bosnia. Indeed, the Dani cover also points to the 
continuing division of Bosnian politics into ethno-national camps and the firm identification of 
individual politicians and parties with specific ethnic groups. 
3.1 Crisis brewing 
The challenges of the year 2006 emerge against this background of the enduring appeal of ethno-
nationalism, underpinned by the provisions and interpretations of the GFAP. This is at heart a 
political rather than a constitutional problem. Constitutional tinkering, while necessary and 
desirable, will not resolve the conflicts that prevent a unified Bosnia. 
The watershed year 2006 has already produced what Silajdzic called “the most serious political crisis 
since the signing of the Dayton peace accords”.25 Police reform has stalled; RS politicians are 
questioning the previously-agreed key for the distribution of revenue from the value-added tax, 
introduced in January 2006 and collected by the central government through its Indirect Taxation 
Authority (ITA);26 there are rumblings from the RS leadership about a possible referendum on 
independence or union with Serbia; political discourse has dramatically deteriorated in the run-up to 
the general election; constitutional amendments aimed to strengthen the central government failed  
 
______________________ 
24 See Anes Alic, “Bosnia faces Another, Predictable Poll,” ISN Security Watch, July 28, 2006, available at 
<www.isn.ethz.ch/>. The latest polling data publicly available put the SNSD far ahead of the SDS in the RS, with 35 against 
15 percent. See “Poll on popularity of Bosnian parties, politicians on eve of elections published,” HINA news agency report 
carried by BBC Monitoring, September 6, 2006. 
25 Edina Sarac, “Stranci za BiH su potrebni saveznici,” Dnevni avaz, July 31, 2006.  
26 In late July, a temporary compromise was hammered out for July and August, prompting the threat of a lawsuit from the 
District of Brcko. See “Bosnian indirect tax agency agrees on temporary solution to fund distribution,” Onasa news agency, 
report carried by BBC Monitoring, July 26, 2006, and “Bosnia’s Brcko District disappointed, angry over tax funds shareout,” 
Onasa report carried by BBC Monitoring, July 26, 2006. 
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to garner the necessary two-thirds majority in Bosnia’s parliament in late April; and the 
announcement by the OHR that it intends to close shop by the end of June next year provides 
incentives for obstructionist politicians to sit it out. 
All this is taking place in a highly unstable regional context, with Serbia feeling under pressure from 
many sides. Montenegro has left the state union; Kosovo is likely to get some sort of independence, 
perhaps before the year is over, against the will of the Serbian government and large parts of its 
population; and Belgrade’s SAA will remain suspended until the government can convince the EU 
that it is serious about apprehending and transferring war crimes fugitives, above all Ratko Mladic. 
In the early summer of 2006, indications began to emerge of an orchestrated campaign by Bosnian 
Serbs to obstruct the operations of key central government institutions. On July 22, it was reported 
that the Bosnian Serb representatives on the governing board of the ITA refused to take over the 
rotating presidency, which would have been theirs according to schedule.27 The week before, the 
Bosnian Serb members of the Police Reform Commission had done the same.28 This came at a time 
when the leadership in Belgrade intensified its rhetoric on the ‘regional implications’ of Kosovo’s 
status, seen by many Bosnian observers as little short of a threat that RS would secede if Kosovo 
became independent. In a high-profile opinion piece published in the Washington Post on July 12, 
Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica wrote, “Viewed strategically, and not just with regard to 
preserving stability in the Balkans, the arguments against an independent Kosovo are equally strong: 
Independence for Kosovo would surely be viewed as a precedent, setting off similar demands 
elsewhere.” This is a barely disguised reference to the RS. Just to make sure that everyone 
understood the thrust of the argument, the piece continued, “Those who argue otherwise are, quite 
simply, closing their eyes to the hard facts. Resolving the problems of national minorities through 
self-determination (especially in the case of nationalities that already have their own countries 
nearby) inevitably leads to border changes and all the dangerous complications that this entails”.29 
There is no sense in the piece that the “hard facts” do not simply emerge in a vacuum, and that the 
Prime Minister of the largest and most powerful country of former Yugoslavia might have a role in 
shaping them. That such a position met with sharp protests from non-nationalist Bosnian politicians 
working towards the preservation of their country is not surprising.30 
Against this backdrop of diplomacy and high politics, the everyday lives of Bosnia’s citizens continue 
to reflect the pathologies of the country’s political sphere. At the same time, as long as division 
persists on the ground, there is little incentive for Bosnia’s political elite to engage in compromise 
and accommodation. According to the UNDP’s latest quarterly report in its Early Warning System 
series, 82% of interviewees in Bosniak majority areas are very proud to be citizens of Bosnia; in Serb 
majority areas, the share is 20%.31 School curricula (and in some cases, actual school buildings) are 
still divided between the ethnic communities, while education overall continues to fail both students 
and the economy by turning out too many graduates with the wrong skills. Highly-skilled individuals  
 
 
______________________ 
27 BHTV, main evening news, 22 July 2006. 
28 “Serb Members of Bosnian Police Directorate Refuse to Assume Rotating Leadership,” Oslobodjenje, July 18, 2006, carried 
by BBC Monitoring, July 19, 2006. 
29 Vojislav Kostunica, “Justice for Serbia: Kosovo Independence Imperils Our Democracy,” Washington Post, July 12, 2006. 
Kostunica reiterated the linkage Kosovo-RS several times. See, e.g., “Serbian Premier Says Bosnia’s Dayton Accord Must Be 
Respected,” SRNA news agency, July 28, 2006, carried by BBC Monitoring. 
30 “Serbian President Accused of Meddling in Bosnia’s Internal Affairs,” FENA news agency, July 20, 2006, carried by BBC 
Monitoring.  
31 EWS, First Quarterly Report 2006, p.40, available at <www.undp.ba>.  
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continue to seek their fortunes abroad, possibly in quite substantial numbers.32 Economic activity is 
still shackled by politics, as is most obvious from the process of privatization. Workers in offices, 
shop floors, and construction sites are mostly among their own. Indeed, it would be difficult to think 
of any sphere of public life in Bosnia where ethnic affiliation did not play an important role; this even 
applies to its cultural and artistic life. Little surprise, then, that ethnic mobilization is the Bosnian 
politicians’ favorite tool. 
3.2 The constitutional debate 
In April, a set of constitutional amendments, drafted largely by U.S. experts in close consultation 
with Bosnia’s main parties and designed to streamline the cumbersome policy process,33 failed to 
garner the required two-thirds majority in Bosnia’s state parliament.34 This means that the 
government to be formed after the elections will initially have to operate under the GFAP 
Constitution, which has in the eyes of large majorities among Bosnians of all ethnic backgrounds 
outlived its usefulness. (According to a September 2005 poll, 72.6% of all Bosnians agreed with the 
proposition that the current constitution “does not work,” with solid majorities among all three 
groups.35) There is a widespread recognition that the Dayton Constitution presents an obstacle on 
Bosnia’s path to eventual EU membership, a strategic goal shared by large majorities of all ethnic 
groups and virtually the entire political establishment. The defeat of the constitutional package, 
however, also underlines the fact that it is not Bosnia’s constitution that is the source of current 
problems but the posture of Bosnia’s ethno-nationalist communities and their representatives. This 
also means that constitutional amendments will not deliver the sudden relief from ethno-nationalist 
politics many domestic commentators seem to expect. It is important to recognize that the oddities 
of Bosnia’s constitutional system do not produce obstructionist policies; rather, it takes 
obstructionist policies to make the group-rights and federal provisions into an obstacle to effective 
governance.36  
The amendments, despite being quite modest in scope and ambition, were defeated by opposition 
from Silajdzic’s SBiH and the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990), which had split from the 
HDZ and effectively assumed its succession earlier in 2006. The HDZ 1990 raised fears - not entirely 
unreasonable - that Croats could be more easily outvoted, while the SBiH rejected what it saw as a 
consolidation of the entity system. This is ironic since the continued existence of the entities and the 
continued application of the entity voting system in Bosnia’s state parliament were preconditions set 
by the RS parties for their participation in the constitutional consultations. Without these two 
provisions, the Serb parties would not have agreed to the amendments (or indeed the process that 
led to them), but their inclusion made the amendments unacceptable to a sufficient number of 
Bosniak and Croat representatives for the package to be defeated. RS leaders understood correctly 
that a certain anxiety on the part of international mediators for a process of constitutional talks to 
begin could be utilized strategically to extract concessions for participation while still appearing to 
be constructive; it is unlikely they would have realized at the time that these concessions would lead  
 
______________________ 
32 According to the UN Population Fund’s 2006 report, remittances contribute 0.5 percent to the total GDP of all of Europe; in 
Moldova, that figure is 27.1 percent, in Bosnia 23.1 percent, and in Serbia-Montenegro 18 percent. UNFPA, Migration in 
Brief: Europe (2006), available at <www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/presskit/index.htm>. 
33 See R. Bruce Hitchner, “From Dayton to Brussels: The Story Behind the Constitutional and Governmental Reform Process in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30:1 (Winter 2006), pp.125-135.  
34 See Mirna Zkrbic and T.K. Vogel, “Bosnia: Constitutional Reform Falters,” Transitions Online, April 27, 2006, and TOL, 
“Constitutional Reform: Streamlining Bosnia,” Transitions Online, April 24, 2006. 
35 Reported in ó Tuathail et.al., “Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton,” p. 67. 
36 This judgment does not apply to those provisions that are clearly discriminatory and have been singled out by the Venice 
Commission.  
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to a defeat of the entire package in parliament (the final vote was extremely close) but the outcome 
cannot have been entirely unwelcome to them. 
The window for constitutional reform has now closed and will probably remain shut for the 
remainder of the year: the months after October 1 will be taken up by potentially lengthy and 
complex coalition talks at state and entity levels. The new government, however, will find the issue 
high on its agenda - yet the conditions remain unpromising. That the April amendments failed to 
garner a majority is worrying since the package dealt with questions that are considerably less 
divisive than those that will ultimately need to be tackled, above all the question of the country’s 
territorial organization.  
To Bosnia’s Serbs, the continued existence of the RS is non-negotiable. This is in principle a 
reasonable position as long as the existence of the RS does not impede the effectiveness of 
governance at the state level, especially with regards to decisions that need to be taken in pursuit of 
Euro-Atlantic integration (including police reform). In other words, how reasonable the RS stance is 
hinges on the extent to which the RS conceives of governance reform as a zero-sum game where any 
gain in effectiveness of the central government translates into a loss in power for the authorities in 
Banja Luka.  
Bosniaks tend to oppose the RS because in their minds, it embodies ethno-national exclusion and 
‘ethnic cleansing’ while Croats oppose the fact that Bosnia’s Serbs have their own entity while the 
same is denied to them. (They instead have to make do with the cantons they dominate.)  
In many ways, the deadlock produced by Bosnia’s political forces in the framework of its constitution 
is a replica of the problems that afflicted the model of governance that prevailed in Yugoslavia, 
especially under the 1974 constitution. A different comparison, but making much the same point, 
was made by a prominent international lawyer, Zoran Pajic, on the eve of the war. “What we have 
here in Bosnia is an exact model of the Lebanese situation,” he told the Washington Post in 1991. 
“Three nationalist parties thought they could share power in a very simplistic way, but what 
happens in reality is they block each other, they don't trust each other”.37 This depressing diagnosis 
still applies today. But the fact also remains that such constitutions are the result, not the cause, of 
disagreement and conflict. 
Bosnia’s constitution is an extreme example of ethno-federalism, with the group-rights provisions 
typical of consociational regimes and the territorial provisions typical of federal arrangements. 
According to Caplan, these provisions, “whose chief and perhaps only virtue is to deny political 
control to any one national group,” have “entrenched the fissures of the war and have thus 
inhibited BiH from functioning as an effective state”.38 But it is also true that without them, Bosnia’s 
continued existence as a single, independent country would have been all but impossible. Bosnia’s 
constitution is a snapshot of the balance of power between the incompatible state-building projects 
for a Greater Serbia, a Greater Croatia, and an independent, unified Bosnia prevailing at the time of 
the Dayton talks, and also between local actors and the international community. It is what O’Brien 
calls a backward-looking cease-fire rather than a forward-looking settlement. Its greatest weakness 
in practical terms lies in the unwieldy government structures it created: longer-term demands of 
good governance were subordinated to the need to get agreement of the parties to the conflict. 
“The Dayton Agreement included forward-looking provisions for democracy and individual rights,”  
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O’Brien writes. “The machinery of government, however, made it hard to root out nationalists”.39 In 
addition, the international community lacked the resolve and a strategy to confront the nationalists 
in the immediate post-war period by making use of the constitution’s innovative provisions as a sort 
of Trojan horse.40 
Over the years, the constitution itself has become a problem by burdening the country with largely 
unworkable governance structures that are overbearing and ineffective at the same time. (Yet, it is 
necessary to stress again that more cooperative politicians could have made these mechanisms 
work.) Above all, the constitution enshrined the horizontal division of Bosnia into two entities (plus 
what would become the District of Brcko) and its vertical division into state, entity, and municipal 
government, with one of the entities structured as a centralized unit and the other a federal state 
consisting of ten cantons. The strategy of the international community to let the entities wither away 
by transferring additional responsibilities to the central government is now coming to its natural 
limit, especially given the impending disengagement of the OHR. This makes it very difficult indeed 
to envisage a way out of the constitutional impasse. 
3.3 Another election for Bosnia 
On October 1, Bosnia’s voters will choose deputies to entity and state parliaments as well as the Bosnian 
and RS Presidencies. Almost everything that has happened in the political arena this year has to be seen in 
this context. As has been the case in the four previous polls since the end of the war, this general election 
has provided incentives for ethnic mobilization and provoked small-scale incidents.41  
This incentive is strong in both entities due to the realignment of parties taking place in each of the three 
communities, where the national-conservative big-tent parties of each group are in the process of being 
replaced. In the Federation, the SDA is fighting a strong challenge by the SBiH while the HDZ is in danger 
of being pushed aside by the HDZ 1990. Both the SBiH and the HDZ 1990 strongly opposed the April 
constitutional amendments, and prominent HDZ 1990 leaders have in the meantime begun calling for a 
third entity for the Bosnian Croats.42 In the RS, Prime Minister Dodik’s SNSD has been replacing the 
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) as the broad-based mainstream party of the Bosnian Serbs. The SNSD, 
while considered moderate by many observers, needs to play up its nationalist credentials and has already 
done so through its calls for an independence referendum. These realignments demonstrate that the 
supposed nationalism of individual politicians and parties strongly responds to political opportunity; it 
would therefore be highly inaccurate to describe any specific party except for the multi-ethnic SDP (and a 
few marginal parties) as either inherently nationalist or inherently anti-nationalist. 
The incentives for ethno-national mobilization are especially strong since the new government will be the 
first to govern without the corrective influence of the OHR. This clearly heightens the stakes at a time of 
increasing uncertainty about reform.  
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As in previous elections, bread-and-butter issues are not at the forefront of the campaign and tend to be 
discussed in ethnic terms. There is little to nothing in terms of principled positions that would distinguish 
the parties with regards to, say, privatization (an issue that is currently topical due to the privatization of 
Bosnia’s three ethnic-based telecom operators). The SDP is the only one among the main parties with a 
sharper ideological profile that does not simply revolve around the national question.  
Polls put the SNSD far ahead of the SDS in the RS. The dominant parties in the Federation are the SDA, the 
SDP, and the SBiH.43 The anticipated low turnout (expected to be below 50 percent) and the high number 
of undecideds make polling numbers highly problematic, though they still suggest that the process of 
forming a solid government coalition will be difficult. The task is made even more complex by the 
tendency of most parties to keep all their options open with regards to possible post-election coalition 
partners and by the need to engage in coalition talks at the state as well as the entity level, where the 
balance of power may be very different. The delays incurred by these consultations make it imperative 
that the PIC honestly assess the situation early next year before deciding on a final pullout date.  
The new government will need to draw up and put in practice key reforms, including some that will be 
painful for its own constituencies. There is little doubt that even in case he becomes Prime Minister of 
Bosnia rather than the RS, Dodik will find it difficult to resist the pull of EU integration; since that objective 
is so popular, it would not make much political sense to be blamed for the failure to achieve it.  
Near the top of any government’s agenda will also be economic development, a topic on which most 
parties are virtually silent. Bosnia’s economy is still very much subject to political influence, not least 
through direct state control of key companies and a privatization process that is still heavily politicized 
(and has overall been disappointing). However, overall growth has been good, though from a very low 
level, and exports have increased, while macro-economic stability is satisfactory. The IMF fears, however, 
that budgetary discipline may be decreasing, especially in light of the elections. The smooth introduction 
of VAT and the newly-established ITA, the first state-level office to take over the administration of indirect 
taxes from entity bodies, are positive developments. It is, however, worrying that no permanent 
agreement on the distribution of VAT proceeds has been worked out, and that this important policy area 
is still essentially governed by the ups and downs of party politics. Infrastructure needs have only been 
addressed very slowly, which will hamper economic development for a long time to come; the general 
business climate, meanwhile, is improving but at a slow pace. Prospects for education reform in line with 
the demands of a modern economy and EU integration are uncertain, especially as a higher-education law 
has still not been passed. The incoming administration will need to resolutely tackle these issues while 
also trying to pull off much-needed compromises on police reform and constitutional amendments. 
3.4 The war crimes questions 
It is no coincidence that the need to arrest all persons indicted for war crimes was a key element of the 
GFAP: without justice there could be no lasting peace. Likewise, it is no coincidence that IFOR/SFOR was a 
reluctant implementer of the relevant provisions, at least initially: after all, if the overriding objectives of 
the deployment were the avoidance of casualties and the preservation of stability at the cost of almost 
anything else, not arresting indicted individuals made good sense. But it is also likely that many of the 
protagonists at Dayton will have dismissed, at least privately, the ICTY (and with it, the very notion of 
justice and accountability) as a fig leaf for international inaction. Little did they know that the Hague 
tribunal would mature into one of the most powerful political actors in the region. Croatia saw its 
membership talks with the EU postponed twice over fugitive Ante Gotovina; only a positive assessment by  
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Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte made the opening of talks in early October 2005 possible. Gotovina was 
arrested in Tenerife two months later and transferred to The Hague.44 Similarly, Serbia’s talks on an SAA 
are currently on hold due to the lack of concrete evidence that the authorities are actively pursuing 
Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic.  
Mladic’s arrest or surrender, should it indeed take place, may stimulate the domestic debate about 
transitional justice, which has in recent weeks been picked up - though mostly in an adversarial, ill-
tempered manner - after the ICTY sentenced the Bosniak wartime commander of Srebrenica, Naser Oric, 
to just two years in prison for crimes against Serbs. At the time of this writing, video footage of operations 
by the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army is also coming to light (or more likely, being selectively leaked to 
the media), showing Bosniak commander Atif Dudakovic ordering the torching of Serb villages in Bosnia. 
The same footage also appears to show the killing of unarmed men.45 The reaction to the new videotapes 
underlines the need for mechanisms of transitional justice to mediate between the incompatible narratives 
the three communities hold about the war and its origins - something that is precisely outside the remit of 
the ICTY.  
Indeed, the footage allowed all three sides to roll out their respective myths about the war. The Bosnian 
Serbs say that they defended themselves against an Islamic fundamentalist government in Sarajevo while 
Bosnia was engulfed in a nasty civil war in which all sides committed crimes. The Dudakovic tapes are 
most useful to that argument since they appear to show Bosniak soldiers murdering unarmed men, 
possibly civilians, in cold blood. Croats are pointing the finger at the Bosniaks with which they were allied 
at the time the pictures were taken. They maintain that all the crimes shown on the tapes were committed 
by the Bosniaks, notably a special unit reportedly made up and commanded by foreign jihadists but 
attached to Dudakovic’s army. The Bosniaks are playing down what the pictures seem to show, insist on 
the virtue of their cause, and turn the war-crimes argument around to demand the abolition of RS.  
The mutual recriminations soon descended into farce. After RS President Cavic and Prime Minister Dodik 
pressed charges against Dudakovic (which was entirely unnecessary since Bosnia’s State Court was 
already investigating), Bosniak Presidency member Sulejman Tihic gave a statement saying that the RS 
could not remain as a political category since it was based on genocide, war crimes, and ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ Dodik seized the opportunity to reiterate his call for an independence referendum.46 Tihic also 
framed the issue not in terms of individual responsibility but of the general virtue of the Bosnian defense 
against Serb forces.  
In principle, these two dimensions of war crimes - individual responsibility and state action - are 
distinguished also by the way they are prosecuted: the ICTY rules over individuals while the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) is responsible for crimes committed by one state against another, for example the 
alleged genocide for which the Bosnian government (in practice, Bosniak politicians) is currently seeking 
compensation from the Serbian government before the ICJ.47 In practice, the distinction is not always so 
neat - indeed, for many Bosnians, it hardly seems to exist. In defense of a just cause, the reasoning goes, 
no crimes will have been committed. Often, this is where the analysis ends.  
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The diagnosis that many of Bosnia’s current-day problems stem from unreconciled narratives about the 
conflict and their exploitation by politicians trying to capitalize on the prevailing zero-sum politics applies 
most directly to questions surrounding war crimes, notably to what extent such crimes were part of a 
strategy to drive out ‘enemy’ populations in order to create ‘pure’ territories for inclusion in Greater Serbia 
or Greater Croatia - a strategy that by necessity involved the widespread commission of war crimes.48 In 
this sense, the nationalists are right: beyond individual responsibility there is the broader issue of what 
was at stake during the war, and the war’s very nature: was it a civil war, as most Serbs and Croats 
allege, or an international aggression, as most Bosniaks believe? 
At present, the eyes of those who maintain an interest in justice are firmly trained on The Hague. Indeed, 
for most of the post-war period, justice for war crimes was essentially international justice, with all the 
problems associated with it. These have been summarized best in a recent paper by John Allcock, whose 
conclusion is clear: “International justice, in the form of the ICTY, has been characterized by attention to 
its legitimacy at the international level, both in terms of its sound footing in a body of international law 
and the professionalism of its conduct. The cost of this has been a sacrifice of effectiveness, because it has 
been incapable of meeting more than a fraction of the total demands placed on it, and of legitimacy, both 
because it has been incapable of addressing some questions of justice which are central to the inhabitants 
of the region, and because it is perceived as distant and unresponsive in its conduct”.49 
It is only in recent years that Bosnia’s State Court with its special war crimes chamber has begun its work, 
including on cases that were directly transferred from the ICTY, and the ICTY is no longer opening new 
prosecutions as it is scheduled to close down in a few years’ time. (All cases before the State Court need 
to be approved by the ICTY to prevent political trials.) This was made possible by robust international 
action in reforming Bosnia’s judiciary. But if the positive developments in the Bosnian judiciary came 
about as a result of international action, it is also true that the phase-out of international criminal justice 
at The Hague and the transfer of cases to domestic courts is primarily driven by international rather than 
domestic agendas.  
While the State Court is widely credited with professionalism, the war crimes question continues to 
provide opportunities for perpetuating zero-sum politics and ethno-national mobilization. The difficulties 
Bosnia is experiencing with transitional justice are a manifestation of the difficulty of state-building in a 
society that continues to be divided with regards to the basic vision of an end state as well as to the 
historical truth about its recent past.50 
3.5 Regional instability and calls for a referendum 
The year 2006 brought the liquidation of the last vestiges of the old Yugoslavia. In June, following a 
referendum in May, Montenegro left the dysfunctional State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which had 
replaced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in March 2003 (largely at the insistence of the EU, loath to do 
deal with yet another state in the Balkans), and it is widely expected that the international community will 
impose a final status for Kosovo - nominally still a Serbian province though since 1999 de facto a NATO 
protectorate administered by the UN - on a recalcitrant Serbia. Both developments are already being 
instrumentalized by forces that expect to gain from instability, especially those that never accepted the 
existence of an independent, fully sovereign Bosnian state in the first place. While there is little doubt that 
Bosnia’s existence is not in danger, the fact that politicians are willing and able to exploit separatist  
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sentiment in RS, as well as within the Croat community, is worrying indeed since it highlights the fragile 
domestic legitimacy of the Bosnian state.    
RS Prime Minister Dodik was the first mainstream politician to instrumentalize Montenegro’s 
independence referendum by calling for a similar exercise in the RS, which would “give people the 
opportunity to decide what they think and want of Bosnia-Herzegovina”.51 He later downgraded his 
demand to a “theoretical consideration of (…) a theoretical possibility”,52 but neither excited Serbs nor 
worried Bosniaks took this at face value, and Dodik subsequently reiterated his position that 99 percent of 
Serbs in RS would vote for independence and that a referendum was inevitable if Kosovo became 
independent, or Bosnia came under the influence of “radical Islamic politics,” or non-Serb politicians tried 
to reduce the autonomy of the RS.53 
Dodik’s referendum idea was, as if on cue, taken up by party officials in Serbia. A spokesperson for Prime 
Minister Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) told the Serbian daily Dnevnik when asked about 
Dodik’s statements, “If one nation in one part of a country is granted a certain right, we see no reason 
why this right to a referendum is denied to someone else”.54 With that, the connection between 
Montenegro, the RS, and Kosovo had been publicly, and officially, established. Kostunica’s opinion piece 
in the Washington Post of July 12 fit right into that line of argument.  
The implications for Bosnia of the determination of Kosovo’s final status are only too clear, and they don’t 
depend in any major way on whether the final status is determined through negotiation between the 
parties (which appears highly unlikely) or through some sort of imposition by the international community. 
They also won’t depend on whatever conditionality may be imposed on Kosovo since few observers doubt 
that the outcome will eventually be full independence. With those two qualifications in mind, there are 
only two scenarios that need analyzing here. Neither is good news for Bosnia. 
In the first scenario, the entire Serbian province of Kosovo would gain independence (conditional or 
otherwise), probably with very strong provisions for the protection of ethnic minorities. This would be the 
first instance of a territory that never had the status of a republic under any of Yugoslavia’s constitutions 
gaining independence; all previous new states in former Yugoslavia were full republics under the old 
system. On the surface, this would seem to create a precedent for the independence of a sub-republican 
territory such as RS; the analogy in this scenario would be between RS and Kosovo on the one hand and 
Bosnia and Serbia on the other. This is legal nonsense, however: RS, in contrast to Kosovo, is an entirely 
artificial entity whose borders with the Federation were never, in any form, in evidence previously, while 
Kosovo in its present borders was an autonomous province of Serbia with quasi-republican status under 
the Yugoslav constitution.  
In the second scenario, Kosovo would gain independence but its northernmost region north of the divided 
town of Mitrovica, with its concentration of ethnic Serbs, would remain with Serbia. This would be the 
first instance of a formerly Yugoslav territory being partitioned along ethnic lines and receiving 
international recognition. If this were taken as a precedent, the analogy would be between RS and 
Mitrovica-North on the one hand and Bosnia and Kosovo on the other.  
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While it is to be expected that either scenario will be exploited by the Bosnian Serbs, the power of 
precedent also needs to be put in perspective. The international community, and especially the EU, has 
made it abundantly clear that it frowns upon the creation of new states in general. It did so, for example, 
by imposing stringent conditions on the Montenegrin referendum. It has also made it clear that Kosovo 
will be a lone exception to the state practice of not recognizing breakaway territories, of which there are a 
number on the fringes of the old Soviet Union and elsewhere. This may not be terribly consistent but 
makes perfect political sense. The RS simply lacks the powerful international backer that could promote 
the idea of independence within the international community, and its independence would run counter to 
everything the sponsors of Dayton have been striving to achieve in the Balkans. 
Furthermore, if the Bosnian war failed to deliver independent statehood to RS, the peace cannot be 
expected to do so either. What war and ‘ethnic cleansing’ could not achieve is unlikely to be gained by the 
less drastic instruments now at the disposal of the power-wielders in Banja Luka - above all, blocking the 
working of Bosnia’s central government. But if actual secession is a very remote prospect, any 
independence bid, however much it will be bound to fail, still has the potential to generate considerable 
domestic problems for Bosnia and to consume much political energy needed elsewhere.  
From this, two distinct objectives may be imputed to key policymakers in Banja Luka and Belgrade. The 
first, presumably of greater interest to the Belgrade authorities and part of the diplomatic endgame over 
Kosovo, is to fend off Kosovo’s independence in a rearguard action, a futile operation if ever there’s been 
one (and one whose futility is no doubt understood by the Serbian government). The second, presumably 
mainly in Banja Luka’s interest and firmly rooted in Bosnian domestic politics, would be to hold Bosnia’s 
central government and the more activist parts of the Bosniak political establishment such as Haris 
Silajdzic at bay and to preempt any reform that can be construed as a move towards the abolition of RS. 
This second strategy was in fact expressed in a joint statement by Dodik and RS President Dragan Cavic of 
June 28, in which they warned that attempts by one constituent people to change the Dayton accords 
without the consent of another constituent people would lead to a domestic and regional crisis that could 
equally likely lead to the unitarization as to the disintegration of Bosnia.55 
Since the disruptive potential of the referendum course is considerable even if its eventual defeat is 
preordained, the international community needs to persist with its demands - that calls for secession from 
Bosnia stop - since these calls aim not only at the Dayton peace but also at Bosnia’s territorial integrity. 
The question whether by the same token, frequent calls by Bosniak politicians, notably the SBiH, for the 
abolition of the entity system (i.e., the RS) should also be confronted will, however, require a more 
nuanced answer. On the one hand, the entity system is at the heart of the GFAP and its abolition would in 
effect endanger the Dayton system as well. At the same time, it is surely the case that Bosnia’s politicians 
should be allowed to openly discuss the future constitutional set-up of the country, including various 
arrangements for the restructuring of the entity system. This seems well within the boundaries of 
acceptable political discourse, while unilaterally changing an internationally recognized border is not. 
In such a situation, it is unhelpful for former HR Carl Bildt to suggest that RS had become “as permanent 
as Scotland”.56 The comparison plays into the hands of the secessionist by stressing the conceptual 
primacy of the entity over the state, which in the case of Scotland has sources in actual history. But the RS 
was not a pre-existing unit that was absorbed into a new Bosnian state, the way Croatia and Serbia were 
in the first Yugoslavia. Bosnia has a considerable degree of historical continuity - though not modern 
independent statehood - within roughly its present-day borders. RS, by contrast, is an entirely artificial 
construct whose appeal to its ethnic foundation is in fact highly dubious, given that just over half of the  
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pre-war population of today’s RS was ethnically Serb. It is ironic that the champions of RS are precisely 
those who reject Bosnia’s right to exist by pointing to its artificial character.  
RS politicians have in the past months shown that they are perfectly willing to activate all the blocking 
mechanisms, formal and informal, that the GFAP put at their disposal, and the referendum issue will not 
be an exception. Developments in the Police Reform Commission demonstrate that they have no qualms 
about holding the EU aspirations of all of Bosnia hostage to their particularist agenda. The referendum 
drive, fueled by the Kosovo status determination, will be defeated, but it will no doubt be used to counter 
calls for any constitutional restructuring that would diminish the power of the entities.  
This has little to do with the ‘nationalist’ character of any specific party. Dodik’s SNSD as well as Bosnian 
Foreign Minister Mladen Ivanic’s Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) are nominally less nationalist than 
the SDS but have demonstrated time and again that they will use ethno-nationalist arguments in pursuit 
of their agendas. This is a direct result of the fact that power is lodged at the entity level and voting 
structured along ethnic lines, which creates strong incentives for politicians to focus on their core 
constituencies instead of reaching out across the ethnic divide. As long as the entity system and the 
related provisions of the GFAP are in force, this mechanism will kick in whenever far-reaching decisions 
have to be taken. 
3.6 European integration and the fate of police reform 
The SAA is a first contractual step on the way towards eventual membership in the EU. It is in essence a 
trade-related agreement tailored to the specifics of each applicant country. Since Bosnia has de facto 
enjoyed many of the benefits of the SAA since the EU extended its trade preferences to the entire region in 
the year 2000, its economic impact is expected to be negligible.57 However, the conclusion of an SAA 
would send an important signal that Brussels considers Bosnia to have stabilized sufficiently to undertake 
the considerable reform still needed to meet the EU’s membership criteria. It would also allow Bosnia’s 
central government to continue to press changes required for European integration.  
The SAA, however, is not a foregone conclusion, despite the widely recognized professionalism of Bosnia’s 
EU negotiators. Indeed, it is in acute danger - and with it, the centerpiece of the international community’s 
current approach to Bosnia, which, according to the ICG, “consists entirely of preparing the country for 
eventual European Union membership in the hope that integration processes will overcome ethno-
political divides and their intertwined economic and criminal interests”.58  
Talks were formally opened on November 25, 2005, after the European Commission (EC) determined in a 
progress report that the country had made “significant progress in addressing the sixteen priorities 
identified in the framework of the 2003 Feasibility Study.” The expectation was expressed at the time that 
the process would last around one year, but few observers expect the SAA to be signed before 2007. The 
EC also made it clear in its report that three areas remained unsatisfactory and would need the full 
attention of the Bosnian authorities: cooperation with the ICTY, adoption of a Law on Public Broadcasting 
Service, and “implementation of the police reform”.59 
This finding, which suggests that the main problem with police reform was its implementation, was only 
possible because the issue of police reform had been fudged. The report maintained, “the Agreement on 
Restructuring of Police has been adopted by the parties, in line with the three principles outlined by the  
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Commission, namely i) all legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters must be vested at 
the state level, ii) no political interference with operational policing and iii) functional local police areas 
must be determined by technically [sic] policing criteria where operational command is exercised at the 
local level”.60 But what the parties had agreed to was simply a statement of these principles, not an actual 
agreement on concrete police regions. In fact, the issue had proven so intractable that there were only 
three options in front of the international community:  
− give up on the idea that SAA talks could be opened under current political conditions. This option was 
politically unpalatable to the international community since it would have put in question the entire 
notion of replacing the OHR’s powers of coercion with the EUSR’s power of persuasion, an approach 
that can only work with the concurrent pull of a tangible EU integration prospect; 
− impose the police regions. This option was unacceptable to the European Commission since it would 
expose a lack of domestic political will to reform, and to the international community at large 
because it would suggest that the Bonn powers were still needed; 
− fudge the issue by focusing on process rather than results. 
This last option was implemented through the establishment of an ad-hoc Police Reform Directorate by 
the Bosnian Council of Ministers in early December. The SDS - still the ruling party in the RS at that time – 
had accepted the three principles in early October 2005, but only after the SNSD had agreed to it and 
under heavy pressure from the international community that included financial restrictions on the party 
and investigations into its financial dealings. As soon as Dodik became Prime Minister, he began 
questioning the legitimacy of the Directorate and declared that the RS could not agree to have its police 
force dissolved. In late July, the Serb members refused to assume the rotating chairmanship of the 
Directorate’s Steering Board,61 and in early August, Dodik told the Sarajevo daily Dnevni avaz that he 
would not allow police reform to happen to the detriment of the RS, “even if it means waiting 10 years to 
begin new [SAA] negotiations”.62 
In the end, the decision will come down to the question whether the RS wants to prevent giving up 
authority over the police more than the international community wants the SAA so it can disengage from 
Bosnia and close down the OHR. (The fact that HR Schwarz-Schilling will stay in Bosnia as EUSR is little 
solace to those Bosnians who think that the OHR has been indispensable in achieving the modest results 
of state-building and the more substantial results of peace implementation of the last years.63) Faced with 
the option of either giving up RS control over its own police or being the lone culprit for a blocked way 
towards the EU, Dodik is more likely to give in; however, the temptation may also exist for the EU to 
water down its own principles and leave some aspects of policing under RS control. 
 
______________________ 
60 Communication, p. 3. 
61 “Serb members of Bosnian Police Directorate refuse to assume rotating leadership,” Oslobodjenje, July 18, 2006, report 
carried by BBC Monitoring. 
62 “Bosnian Serb premier reiterates entity’s right to self-determination,” Dnevni avaz, August 4, 2006, carried by BBC 
Monitoring. 
63 See Admir Malagic, “Medjunarodna zajednica pravi velike grezke u BiH,” Dnevni avaz, August 6, 2006, reporting the views 
of Bosnian Prime Minister Adnan Terzic.  
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3.7 The OHR phase-out 
In its meeting of June 22-23, 2006, the PIC announced its intention to terminate the OHR on June 30, 
2007, subject to confirmation early in 2007.64 While many observers in Bosnia and abroad were puzzled 
by what specific developments may have prompted the PIC’s decision, the decision as such was no 
surprise. 
The OHR was set up under Annex 10 GFAP (civilian implementation) as a temporary, ad-hoc body “to 
facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the 
organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement” (Annex 10, Article 
I.2). This rather narrow brief was considerably expanded with the Bonn powers and other forms of 
political empowerment. But the OHR’s was throughout these years seen as an anomaly that should be 
dispensed with as soon as feasible.  
Critics were especially troubled by the Bonn powers, which they saw as undemocratic, unnecessary, and 
subversive of domestic political development.65 In fact, many supporters of the Bonn powers, including 
inside the OHR, understood perfectly well that they were essentially undemocratic - not just because there 
was no appeals procedure or outside scrutiny of individual decisions, but also because many of the actions 
for which officials were removed were in fact very popular with their constituents. As long as 
unbridgeable antagonisms characterized the relations between the communities, the Bonn powers would 
be indispensable as a last resort - especially once the OHR’s peace implementation mandate had been 
supplemented by a state-building agenda in response to the poor results of international action in 1996-
97. 
The OHR’s phase-out began a few years ago. Strengthened central-level structures and progress in several 
reform areas such as defense, public administration, and taxation made the OHR’s role as a quasi-
substitute government less critical (though its role as a driver of reform in support of good governance 
remained vital). Important modifications to the legal framework across a wide issue area also reduced the 
need for corrective action, while the end of large-scale return movements and the successful completion 
of property restitution meant that intrusive, municipal-level action, and hence a comprehensive network 
of field offices, was no longer required. In result of these developments, the OHR’s staffing levels declined 
significantly: in its peak year 2002, the OHR employed 698 staff, of whom 207 were international. This 
declined to 600 (142 international) in 2004, 457 (107) in 2005, and 324 (72) in 2006.66 
Throughout this period, the OHR’s eventual shutdown was clearly on the horizon but the situation on the 
ground did not appear to support any final decision as to a firm date. The current HR, Christian Schwarz-
Schilling of Germany, came to office on the understanding that he would be the last occupant of the 
position, though that had also been the assumption when Ashdown took over from Petritsch. (Since 
Ashdown, the HR has also served as EUSR, and Schwarz-Schilling will stay in Bosnia in that function 
beyond next June.) For a number of years, successive HRs have been arguing that the OHR’s exit strategy 
would in essence have to be an entry strategy into Europe. 
Given the fact that key reforms required for Bosnia’s deepening relationship with the EU have not been 
agreed upon or implemented and in light of the marked deterioration of the political climate in the first 
half of 2006, many observers were puzzled as to what may have led the PIC to change its previous  
 
______________________ 
64 PIC Steering Board, Towards Ownership: From Peace Implementation to Euro-Atlantic Integration, Sarajevo, June 23, 2006, 
available at <www.ohr.int>. 
65 Classics are David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 1999) and Gerald Knaus and 
Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj,” Journal of Democracy, 14:3 (July 2003), pp.60-74. 
66 OHR Resource Department, personal communication to author, August 8, 2006. 
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assessment that it would be premature to phase out the OHR. A declining appetite on the part of donors 
to pay for the OHR’s operating costs may have played a role, but the fact that the current SAA talks, while 
going well at present, will soon hit the obstacle of stalled police reform suggests that the decision may be 
shortsighted.  
The unfinished reform business prompted observers to call on the HR to adopt a more activist stance 
during the remainder of his mandate.67 There is no evidence so far that Schwarz-Schilling is heeding the 
call. Even if he did heed the call, however, the days of imposition are over: for its last year of existence, 
the OHR will have to concentrate on tying up loose ends rather than engage with difficult questions such 
as amending the constitution or reforming the police.68 And regardless of the inclinations of any single 
officeholder, both the character of the international community’s engagement in Bosnia and its 
institutional set-up are currently undergoing a major transformation that will make it impossible to 
continue the approach of the past. An era is coming to an end in Bosnia.  
This strategic transformation is based partly on the assessment that key provisions of the GFAP (such as 
Annex 7) have been materially fulfilled and partly on the reluctance to see the OHR’s sweeping 
enforcement powers prolonged any more than strictly necessary, especially not in relation with reform 
measures that are seen as critical for Bosnia’s EU integration. This assessment of material reality on the 
ground and the non-desirability of imposed reform has prompted a shift in emphasis away from the OHR’s 
enforcement role to the facilitation role to be exercised by the office of the EUSR. With the closure of the 
OHR, the powers that have so troubled certain observers will now disappear. 
Is June 2007 the right moment for the OHR to close shop? Only the coming months will tell. What is 
certain, however, is that the PIC must take its own words seriously by taking a close interest in all Bosnian 
matters over the remaining period of the OHR’s mandate, especially when it re-assesses the situation early 
next year to confirm - or postpone - the June date for the shutdown. This should be unambiguously 
conditioned on police reform, and perhaps also on concrete steps towards constitutional reform; anything 
else would endanger the OHR’s legacy. The closure of the OHR must be driven by objective conditions and 
not international disengagement agendas. 
 
______________________ 
67 See, for example, Center for European Integration Strategies, How (Not) to End: The OHR’s Last Days in Bosnia, CEIS Policy 
Brief No. 6 (July 13, 2006), available at <www.ceis-eu.org>. 
68 These loose ends include the lifting, or domestic validation, of OHR decisions such as removals or imposed laws. See, for 
example, DPA, “Top international envoy lifts bans on 60 Bosnian politicians,” July 7, 2006. 
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4 Conclusions 
4.1 Bosnia: a ‘self-sustaining’ state? 
When the OHR departs, it will hand over to the EUSR. In fact, the handover will consist of a few people 
leaving, still fewer people arriving, and a change of the sign next to the entrance from ‘OHR’ to ‘EUSR.’ 
The more pressing question is, will Bosnia’s domestic institutions be able to conduct the activities of 
government without the support of the OHR?  
At the most obvious level, the answer is “it depends” - above all, on who gets elected in October 2006. It 
also depends on whether the Bosnian polity will withstand the pressures the year 2007 will bring. But 
that, in turn, is conditioned by deeper issues that this report has outlined - above all, the challenge of 
legitimacy.  
Bosnia today has institutions of government at all levels that function better across a wider policy 
spectrum than they did a few years ago. This improvement has been most dramatic at the state level, 
which has gained massively through the transfer of responsibilities from the entities and various 
assistance programs that helped public administration become more efficient, responsive, transparent, 
accountable, and effective. Bosnia’s central government now raises and distributes taxes through the 
Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA); controls the country’s borders through the State Border Service (SBS); 
provides public security through the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the State Court, 
and defense through an integrated Defense Ministry and chain of command. Bosnia has an increasingly 
functional internal market and macroeconomic stability. These output factors are important elements of 
legitimacy, together with the input factors of democratic procedures (elections, parliamentary 
representation, and so forth). 
The Bosnian state, however, is facing serious challenges in generating legitimacy. These challenges are 
not simply a function of low capacity or cumbersome procedures or even the paralysis produced by the 
constitution’s consociational features; rather, it is in its essence political. A large share - perhaps a majority 
- of Bosnian citizens remain to some extent unreconciled with the very fact that they are citizens of Bosnia 
rather than Croatia or Serbia, or perhaps an independent RS, or indeed Yugoslavia. They may not actively 
work to destroy Bosnia but they will not defend it either. If their primary attachment is to their entity, they 
will see any increase in the effectiveness of the central government as a decrease of the autonomous 
power of their ethno-national community or entity, and because of the inevitable group-rights provisions 
any legitimate settlement will realistically have to include, they will be in a position to block measures that 
would contribute to this. As long as this zero-sum posture is maintained, the Bosnian state will be less 
effective than it could be.  
If we conceptualize legitimacy as depending, at least in part, on the effectiveness of government in 
providing services to citizens, the zero-sum posture will prevent a more robust legitimacy from emerging 
since governance units other than the central state are in a position to block the latter’s production of 
outputs that enhance its legitimacy. This in turn will reinforce citizens’ attachment to entities or cantons, 
or indeed foreign governments, which are able to provide services as well as intangibles - think of 
perceptions of ethnic security, for example - that the central government cannot. As long as this 
mechanism is in place, the Bosnian state will find it exceedingly difficult to generate output legitimacy 
among Bosnia’s Serbs and Croats. 
The sources of the legitimacy gap of Bosnia’s central state are therefore to be found in the primary 
attachment of large parts of its citizenry to other political authorities that have been empowered by the 
GFAP’s group-rights provisions, which allow these units of government to block the delivery of services by 
the central government to citizens and prevent the generation of enhanced legitimacy for the central 
authorities. 
The obvious answer in this situation would be to unblock the political system by removing the group-
rights provisions. It is equally obvious, however, that only the most excessive provisions - those that 
produce paralysis without necessarily advancing any one group’s interests - can be scrapped without a  
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major struggle: the remainder of these blocking mechanisms, which make the zero-sum game between 
entities and the state possible, are unreformable as long as Bosnia’s communities cannot share a view of 
the central government as the primary locus of political power and legitimacy. Such a development would 
not mean that citizens may no longer feel primary attachment to entities or other units of government; in 
many federal or consociational systems, citizens feel closer to the unit from which they draw services (and 
to which they usually pay taxes) than to the central government, but relations between the two levels are 
not seen as zero-sum. Indeed, it would be unrealistic to think that the extensive consociational or group-
rights features of the Bosnian constitution will no longer be needed once the country has stabilized; 
hence, these groups will retain in principle the power to prevent any moves that could endanger their 
national interests. The key is that such blocking mechanisms should only be activated when the genuine 
national interest of one or the other group is at play rather than during routine policy-making as is often 
the case now.  
This analysis suggests that Bosnia’s main problem is political, not constitutional. Bosnia’s constitution 
does allow the Serbs and the Croats (and, in principle, the Bosniaks) to prevent the central government 
from becoming more effective, thereby impeding its generation of legitimacy. But the key issue is that 
they still feel this to be necessary. 
Even if Bosnia’s problems are political in nature they may still have constitutional solutions. Individuals 
cannot be forced to feel loyalty towards a country whose existence they doubt or reject; but their interests, 
preferences, and indeed identities are shaped by the institutional environment in which they operate. This 
was the opening utilized by the international community in its project to build the Bosnian state: it made 
up for the lack of internal legitimacy by providing ‘stateness’ from outside. This approach was applied in a 
literal sense when external actors created the symbols of statehood such as a flag, an anthem, or a 
currency. It is also visible in the way Bosnian citizenship was codified and a citizen’s register and a unified 
passport introduced. Uniform license plates that no longer showed the place of residence of the owner 
were another important element of ‘stateness’ (and a very direct contribution to freedom of movement, 
and hence, return). 
Less tangible markers of stateness provided by external actors include the reality and appearance of 
permanence, a very important asset after a conflict in which the very existence of the state was contested: 
the international community has propped up the Bosnian state and thereby stabilized it in the eyes of its 
citizens, even those who may not care much about it. A critical variable in the equation is the posture of 
Bosnia’s political elites: both the Serb and the Croat separatist agendas have been defeated, though 
perhaps not irreversibly, and Bosnia’s politicians understand this perfectly well. (Even this defeat, of 
course, had largely external sources - the demise of the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes.) His rhetoric 
notwithstanding, even RS Prime Minister Dodik is working within the limits set by the GFAP and within 
the institutions set out there, and his opposition to police reform, while a serious challenge to both the 
central government and the international community, does not threaten Bosnia’s statehood.  
Whether such grumbling acceptance of the reality of Bosnian statehood is enough to secure its long-term 
validity should the international community visibly disengage is an open question. How problematic the 
OHR’s shutdown will be hinges on the mandate and posture of the EUSR, and on whether conditions on 
the ground will be carefully assessed by the PIC in early 2007 before it confirms its decision to close the 
office. In a broader sense, however, it primarily depends on the prospects for Bosnia’s eventual 
membership in the EU. The international community is holding out the prospect of membership as an 
incentive for reform in the hope that the large majorities of Bosnians favoring EU integration will thereby 
be transformed into an effective domestic constituency for reform. The international community is trying 
to stimulate domestic demand for stateness since only that can sustain the Bosnian state over time.  
But this particular equation contains several variables, and not all of them relate to Bosnia. While there 
has never been any principled opposition to the inclusion of all countries of the Western Balkans in the EU 
the way there has been with regards to Turkey, the EU’s current identity crisis is making accession appear  
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a rather distant prospect. This is probably only realistic since even under the best of circumstances, 
Bosnia’s accession is probably still a good ten years off. But after raising Bosnians’ hopes, by design or 
ineptitude, that membership would solve the country’s problems and that it was just within grasp if only 
Bosnia created more effective institutions of government, the wake-up call might be quite unpleasant. 
Bosnians are already discovering that far from being focused on the Balkans, the EU is now mostly 
concerned with itself, rather like the OHR. But beyond the question of when Bosnia might accede, and the 
unrealistic hopes many Bosnians have been entertaining, there is the more worrying question of whether 
the EU’s offer, which is exactly the same as the one it holds out to countries without Bosnia’s troubled 
history, will be enough to sustain reform there. The experience of Romania and especially Bulgaria is not 
encouraging.   
Legitimacy needs to be produced in an ongoing process; it cannot be accumulated once, in the manner of 
political capital. The government’s performance with regards to democratic procedures and the provision 
of services to citizens needs to be of a certain quality that remains more or less consistent over time. 
Despite countless assistance programs, it is not clear that the Bosnian authorities can achieve this at 
present, especially on the output side. Bosnians are still getting very little value from their very expensive 
government. The fact that every major piece of reform in the past has had to be underwritten by 
international bodies does not bode well for a Bosnia without the authority of the OHR. 
It would be all too easy to present an entire catalogue of policy issues where Bosnia’s governments have 
failed their constituents. They have failed to create the conditions for robust economic growth, a failure 
that is especially damaging since it concerns an issue that was neglected by the international community 
until rather late in the game. (An early success, however, was the creation of macroeconomic stability.) 
They have also failed to replace the dominant concept of security as the zero-sum security of individual 
ethno-national communities with a concept of security that would encompass the entire country. These 
are by far the most serious failures since peace and prosperity (that is, public security and economic 
growth) and a viable state are mutually dependent.  
In order to be seen as legitimate, then, the state will need to deliver key services to citizens on an ongoing 
basis, and continuously be receptive to their wishes and aspirations. In Bosnia, this continuous production 
of legitimacy is a severe problem - not because, as critics like David Chandler or Knaus and Martin have 
charged, the state was imposed from outside but because a large proportion of its citizens reject the very 
notion of Bosnian statehood, especially since the central level is prevented by the entities from delivering 
services to citizens. Ten years of peace implementation and external state-building have failed to 
decisively change that dynamic. 
4.2 Outlook for 2006/2007 
Bosnia has a rough patch of road ahead. Its division into three communities, to which one may add the 
group of citizens who will not vote along ethnic lines, means that no single party and no coherent alliance 
of parties is likely to achieve an outright working majority at the state level, a situation that is further 
complicated by the fact that the different alignments in the entities may necessitate different coalitions at 
state and entity level. This will almost inevitably mean a period of several months to allow for 
consultations during which little progress on the key issues of police and constitutional reform, and hence 
closer ties with the EU, is to be expected. The High Representative is likely to be a marginal figure in all 
this, in sharp contrast to coalition talks after previous elections. 
The post-election wrangling is, however, not the biggest challenge Bosnia is facing; after all, complex 
coalition talks are hardly exclusive to the Balkans. Much more worrying is the deterioration of public 
discourse in the run-up to the October poll. This could be dismissed as mere electioneering that will have 
been forgotten the day after the election. The fact remains, however, that this political discourse is an 
expression of Bosnia’s continuing divisions, which make ethno-national mobilization as effective an 
electoral strategy today as it was ten years ago. It is not just the rhetoric but the substance of political  
Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Challenge of Legitimacy 
  
 
30 
 
 
contention that makes key reforms so difficult to achieve: since every issue is refracted through the ethno-
national lens, politics still tend to be zero-sum.  
Nonetheless, neither police nor constitutional reform will disappear as pressing political projects for 
Bosnia. The pressure to agree to police reform - both from the international community and from Bosnians 
eager to have closer ties with the EU - may simply prove too strong for the RS to resist much beyond the 
election; any accommodation may also be helped by the recognition that implementation will present 
numerous opportunities for all sorts of delays. Agreement on police reform would pave the way for an 
SAA to be concluded and for the PIC to confirm, probably in February 2007, its decision to close down the 
OHR. Should RS opposition prove as firm as it is at current, Brussels might well be tempted to seek some 
sort of compromise on an issue that it has declared to be non-negotiable, for a simple reason: the EU has 
no strategy for the stabilization of the Western Balkans other than enlargement. In a sense, it needs the 
countries of the region as much as they need it. We may yet see countries admitted to accession, 
candidate, or association status that may not be entirely ready for it. 69 
 
______________________ 
69  Lynn Bennet, L. 2003: Nepal, Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment. Concept Note. Kathmandu: World Bank. Retrieved 
on 24 November 2004 from: http://www.genderatwork.org/updir/NepalGenderandSocialExclusionAssessment-
ConceptNote.doc. 28. The tables were adapted from Harka Gurung 2002: Janajati and Dalit: The subjugated in Governance. 
Presented at a seminar on ‘Policy Inputs for SDCs Governance Concept’, Kathmandu. 
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